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ABSTRACT
John Netherland: A history of Fire Departments and Fire insurance agencies and how the
problems they faced in the past relate to those in Mississippi today.
(Under the direction of Dr. Douglass Sullivan-Gonzalez)

The work is a history that used both secondary and primary sources. The bulk of the
historical information on national insurance and fire service history was based on secondary
sources while the local perspective is almost solely based on interviews National agencies and
departments faced problems in the 1800’s that are still faced by rural Mississippi institutions;
however these institutions are taking steps to try and prevent the catastrophes of the mid 1800’s.
In doing so the fire departments are answering some of the problems of the urban volunteers of
the 19th century while the Insurance companies are creating a new set of questions.
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Introduction

The sirens wail, like banshees in the night. Ten minutes ago the firemen were asleep in
their beds. Now they are trying to control their breath as their hearts race. The driver is focused
as he weaves through the dark streets and the captain is cool as he directs other units. There is a
house ablaze in the city. As the men dismount they take stock of their situation. They do not
know if there are any residents still inside the half burned structure nor do they know if the
building will hold much longer. Yet still they enter. They break through the door dragging a hose
to fight the dragon while others still search the floor and under the beds for those that could not
find their way out. When it is all said and done they dust off their gear, wash the soot from their
faces and crawl back into bed waiting to only be awakened again.
Their story is not a new one. It is one that has been told for ages. There is fire and it has
been dealt with as long as people have realized that water can be used to extinguish it. However,
there has been an evolution in the way that people deal with this force of nature. Through heart
break and tribulation, lessons were learned and the idea of fire protection evolved and grew.
People formed insurance companies to protect themselves against the threat of losing
everything they owned. These companies thrived, made wrong decisions, suffered the
consequences and then remade themselves into professional institutions. Originally founded on
solid principles and technique in America, the companies over the course of a few decades
descended into something baser. They simply became organizations that wanted to make as
much profit as possible without a thought as to the capital needed to actually cover the loss that
they insured. As the country industrialized fire became more and more pervasive and entire cities
burned. In doing so the insurance business learned time and time again the dangers of
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undercutting rates to make a profit. The lesson had been so hard learned that by the beginning of
the 20th century the companies were able to stand on their own feet when hit with the San
Francisco earthquake and fire, the worst monetary disaster they had faced.
Like the insurance companies Fire Departments in early American history had to learn
lessons of their own. Formed to deal with a problem in the early days of independence they were
originally gallant all volunteer groups seen doing good for their community. By the mid 1800’s
however a system promoting masculinity evolved into one that reveled in alcohol and fighting.
So much so to the point that public attitude shifted of the volunteer departments and a movement
began to create paid firemen.
The problems of the insurance companies and firemen of the 19 th century have not totally
disappeared in the 21st century. The threat of fire is evolving as wild land fires become ever
increasing problems and urban poverty creates a greater fire load. In Mississippi these
institutions are dealing with these new problems along with those that came before while trying
not to make the same mistakes as they did on a national level. Because Mississippi has seen how
these problems became so detrimental in the past century, the way the firemen and insurance
agents are dealing with them is unique in their own right. Volunteer systems have been set up in
ways that discourage fighting and even allow members a stipend for continuing to fight fire.
While insurance companies are regulated in ways to prevent rate cutting to dangerous levels. In
the state some of these techniques have and a profoundly positive effect while others have again
descended into the detrimental practices that the country found itself in 150 years ago.
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Chapter 1: Fire Insurance’s Money Making Dilemma
In the heat of a fire, when the forces of physics are eating away at the belongings and the
life of an individual, it is hard to imagine how money plays into the situation. The fact remains
that money spins the world around. When the smoke lifts, and the water has quenched the thirst
of the fire, the damage remains. That damage costs money. People have tried to find ways to
replace what has been lost. The best system that humanity has found is the insurance system. The
system in America is based on a simple principle. The purchaser pays an underwriter a regular
fee, and that underwriter then agrees to pay for the agreed upon damages that the purchaser may
incur. Essentially, the underwriter is taking a gamble or a risk. Insurees could purchase an
insurance policy and the very next day have their house struck by lightning. The underwriter
would pay for it. The system of the fire insurance has evolved. It began as a toddler institution
that, fueled by greed, descended into a back alley craps game. Only through self-regulation and
great tragedy has fire insurance become what it is today.
Insurance as an idea has lasted through the ages, yet it didn’t become a sound business
until the aftermath of the Great London Fire of 1666. That following year Nicholas Barbon
became the first man to begin to insure buildings against fire hazard. The idea of the
“underwriter“ itself isn’t new one. The term actually originated from ship insurance, a much
older establishment. The term stems from a popular London coffee house where people
speculated on the success of ships and the values of their cargos. When a person wanted to insure
a ship of choice, he wrote name under a board with the ships name. Thus the term underwriter
became common place. 1

1

Harry Brearley, The History Of the National Board of Fire Underwriters; Fifty Years of a Civilizing
Force. (New York: Frederick Stokes Company. 1916), 7-8
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The idea did not stay on the British isle for long. By 1752 the idea of insuring buildings
against the risk of fire had spread to America. The colonies began to flourish, the villages and
camps became cities and towns, and the risk of fire grew. With that risk so too came the
opportunity for insurers to make money. The Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insurance of
Houses from Loss by Fire became the first company to seize the opportunity. Benjamin Franklin
founded the company while looking for a way to help his Philadelphia community regain loss
after fire. The company employed the idea of mutual fire insurance. A mutual company meant
that the company’s operators were also policy holders, not just stock holders. In the mutual
organization the policy holder essentially gained control of the company. For thirty-five years
the company took sole responsibility for the fire insurance trade. The company maintained the
monopoly because turmoil rocked the nation. As war ravaged, the country lacked the
togetherness to foster business. The company, which mainly served the upper and upper middle
class citizenry, may not have taken the most risky approach, but it still put its feet in the door
first.2
The business of fire insurance faced many trials. The danger of incurring too much loss
always loomed high. Essentially, if multiple clients needed to make claims then the company
needed the cash on hand to pay each. Insurance is based on the principle that the ”premiums” or,
what they give in return for protection, are not enough to cover one hundred percent loss on all
the homes or businesses under its protection. These premiums do however present enough
money to cover what the insurance company would see as a reasonable number of losses to their
2

John Bainbridge, Biography of an Idea; The Story of Mutual Fire And Casualty Insurance. (New York.
Doubleday and Company. 1952), 21; Mark Tebeau, Eating Smoke; Fire in Urban America, 18001950.( Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 2003), 57
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customers. When ten people buy insurance it is reasonably expected that only one of the ten’s
houses will burn down in a life time. However, if more loss occurred than the company
anticipated then the premiums could not cover the loss, and the company would still be obligated
to pay out of pocket.3
In these early days the nation lacked government regulation. People still needed to create
a sustainable government. In a state of confusion, the nation trudged through the period of 1776
up until the last decade before the turn of the century. By the 1790s the country had been born
and had even defeated the largest military in the world. The calm began and the new found
prosperity brought new need for insurance. New companies were born with new ideas that would
plant the seeds of change in insurance. The Insurance Company of North America formed in
1792 as a marine insurance company. It sold insurance like many others yet it refused to get
involved in fire insurance for some time. The market simply lacked demand, and avoided
fighting the problem of extreme loss in multiple policyholders. The company faced too much
risk. Yet by 1798 the company brought something new to the table. Many companies had tried to
fight the problem of risk in fire insurance but the idea had seemed below most national
companies. The Insurance Company of North America, however, came up with a clever solution.
The company divided buildings by their risk and offered different rates, higher rates for higher
risk and lower rates for lower risk. The calculations for risk were simple wooden buildings were
higher risk and when “two or more wooden buildings adjoin, a larger premium shall be required
than is demanded on a single wooden building”. By 1806 the idea of a defined rate settings,
based on building material and hazard, became further distilled into a fire rating schedule. The
schedule laid out a very scientific way of determining risk. It established four classes of
3

Robert Barbour, The Agents Guide to Fire Insurance. (Philadelphia: Chilton. 1949), 1
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insurance coverage and made sure to include an up charge for any building found to be adjacent
to a hazardous structure. The Insurance Company of North America company may not have been
the first to make such an implementation, but it is an important one. The new seed of an idea
would grow so that a buildings risk can be assessed and mitigated in order to save the company
money and ultimately the individual policy holders.4
Fire insurance further developed as it began to use the agency system. In today’s
insurance market many cities are sold insurance by people who are acting as agents of the
company and not the people who run the company. Thus, the term insurance agent came to be.
However, in the late 1700’s if a home owner wanted insurance you had to travel to the insurance
office to purchase it. The Insurance Company of North America again adapted the system. When
it wanted to expand its business into Kentucky, instead of opening a full branch it rather
“appoint[ed] suitable and trusted persons at such places as [the president] shall think advisable to
act as surveyors and agents to the company.” Such an innovation made it possible for the
companies to expand farther and farther in the pursuit of profits.

5

These advances were important to the growth and life of insurance companies, but they
had yet to take hold everywhere. Many companies lacked basic knowledge of fire safety and
sought to insure only for profit. By 1830 the insurance companies of Philadelphia covered half
of the total losses incurred in most major cities. Entrepreneurs began to believe that insurance
could be lucrative. Where there is money people are sure to flock, because of this fact of nature
“seventeen new companies were formed between 1823 and 1825.” The actions of many of these
4
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new companies by and large were “unscientific” at best. The vast majority of these early
companies lacked knowledge of fire risk, lacked a rate setting method similar to that of the
Insurance Company of North America, and covered risk at prices far too low to be able to pay
out in order to generate revenue. All of these actions created an atmosphere in insurance that
proved very vulnerable to disasters that required the payment of multiple losses at one time. 6
Fire hazards grew in the 19th century. The industrial revolution began to hit its full stride.
With the growing industrialization came growth in cities and an increase in fire hazards.
Tenements thrown up quickly to house new residents were not made of stone but of cheap wood.
Factories, in an effort to increase profit and due to lack of regulation, would not see the need to
store hazardous materials away from residential areas. Dangerous practices led to dangerous
situations. New York began to forecast the fate of much of the rest of the country. In 1835
conflagrations began to take their toll on the city and insurance companies. On December 16 a
five-story building on the edge of the East River began to burn. Intense winds and a frozen water
sources contributed to one of the worst fires in New York’s history. Fire fighters only checked
the blaze when they used gunpowder from the Navy to explode buildings and thus creating a fire
break. The economic loss proved devastating. The loss included 674 buildings and a monetary
loss of twenty million dollars. The insurance companies could not cope. Many in the pursuit of
profit, lacked the capital on hand to pay the victims that requested compensation. Eighteen
companies folded in the aftermath. Yet the remaining companies did not learn any lessons from
the disaster. New companies took the place of those that had lost everything and continued to
lower rates and insure risky structures in order to create more profit. The cycle repeated itself
again in the “Broad Street fire of 1845,” so much so that by the year 1865 seventy new

6
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companies had been created. 7
Slowly, the more conservative minds of the industry began to see the problem. Their idea
to combat the problem needed time to gather steam. The idea involved organizing into a fire
boards. One of the first local fire boards became established in New York. The City’s recent
major fires made it an optimal place. The new boards aimed to curb the “cut throat competition
of the insurance market place, forcing premium rates down and agents’ commissions up.” The
New York Board of Fire Underwrites hoped that self-regulation in the industry could accomplish
its goal. The Board thought that making rates uniform though out all companies would allow be
the best way to tackle the problem. 8
By the mid-1800s the nation again found itself in a war that ravaged the land and people.
During such a war few companies were able to get a firm foothold. Decimated, the South’s
economy would need decades until basic services would return, much less insurance companies.
Elsewhere insurance companies were descending back into the chaos that punctuated insurance
life prior to the war. Yet America had come out the victor and saw another rise in both fire load
and insurance companies as its economy took on the weight that the south could no longer hold. 9
These companies again acted as if they didn’t learn the lessons that had been hard fought
for in New York. There were many more conflagrations to come that would inflict deep wounds
on the insurance business. When looking at the landscape in 1866 that thought of destruction
seemed far distant. The imperceptibility of the coming storm stemmed from the formation of the
7

Robert S. Holzman, The Romance of FireFighting. (New York: Bonanza Books. 1956), 29-31; Harry
Brearley10
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first national insurance organization, the National Board of Fire Underwriters(NBFU). The birth
of the company flowered from the ashes of a city after the Fourth of July and a simple fire
cracker. The fire that ensued after the firework’s early explosion destroyed half a mile swath of
the city scape of Portland. Further, ten thousand Portland residents were homeless. Amid fears
that the insurance companies could not pay for the disaster, companies from all over New
England met with a spirit to “do something without delay.” After several further meetings, the
new organization met on the day of its founding, July 18, 1866. The importance of setting up the
objectives of the organization that plays one of the most influential roles in the future of the
insurance business proved paramount. These objectives were geared toward the idea that the
foolhardy tactics of many companies of the day could be curbed. The objectives state:
1.To establish and maintain, as far as practicable, a system of uniform rates of premium;
2. To establish and maintain a uniform rate of compensation to agents and brokers;
3. To repress incendiarism and arson by combining in suitable measures for the
apprehension, conviction, and punishment of criminals engaged in nefarious
business;
4. To devise and give effect to measures for the protection of our common interests and
the promotion of our general prosperity.
The NBFU organization would become the embodiment of progressive insurance companies,
with the great strides it would make in the business. The shortcomings, however, lay in the
organization’s lack of ability to rope in all companies of the era. 10
Though the NBFU would calm the seas in time, the insurance business remained
10
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clandestine in the early 1870’s. The NBFU even reached its lowest levels of adherence and
power in 1870 and 1871. All the success soon changed with the abundance of fires that would
soon burn the country’s largest cities to dust. Chicago had grown tremendously in the decades
prior to 1871, constructing nearly 7000 buildings in 1865 alone. The fire load for such expansive
growth posed an enormous risk. Irresponsible risk would lead to disaster. On the night of
October 7th the Chicago Fire Department struggled to battle a blaze that destroyed twenty acres
and injured thirty firemen. The blaze exhausted the 185 man force. Nothing could have prepared
them for the next day. On the 8th of October 1871, a cow supposedly kicked over a kerosene
lamp and changed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. The great fire danger came from
the lack of rain in the city. It had not rained in almost four months. The ensuing blaze left people
awestruck. Eyewitnesses who escaped told what they saw when their wooden “sidewalks were
all ablaze and fire ran along them as fast as they could walk. Roofing became detached in great
sheets and drove through the sky like flaming arrows.” The exhausted Fire Department could not
contain a blaze that would go on to kill 250 people and incurred damaged of $168 million in the
money of the time. The blaze most notably destroyed Chicago’s business district and included
the sites for future Chicago landmarks in the burn pattern, such as the Tribune Tower and the
Sears Tower. 11
The very next year in 1872 Boston would burn. The fire began normally enough,
however the Fire Department of Boston faced serious problems in furnishing the personnel and
equipment needed to fight a blaze. In the fleet of 21 steam-powered, horse-drawn fire engines of

11
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the time, only six horses could be used to haul the behemoths due to illness. Further, of the 363
men who served the city as volunteers, only 106 were accounted for to save the city. Boston’s
buildings infinitely accelerated the process of the blaze as well. The acceleration is largely due to
the abundance of Mansard Roofs in the Boston shopping district. A mansard roof is simply
multiple conjoined buildings with one large unblocked attic space. Although these roofs are
aesthetically eloquent, the large open space in the apex of the building provides a perfect conduit
for a fire to start in one building and then spread to an entire Block. After a day and a half,
outside help arrived to finally extinguish the blaze. By that time the toll had been taken: twelve
were dead and the price tag estimates ranged between 100 million and 125 million. The
Insurance Company of North America alone would end up paying close to a million dollars. 12
During the entire period of conflagrations, insurance again returned to its poor habit of
too many companies and too low of rates. Throughout the country “those were the days ‘when
every cellar held an insurance company.’” The men of these companies were so dangerously
consumed with profit that four companies might occupy the same small building,d and some
would not even have any capital on hand for fires. The NBFU recognized the problem in a
meeting during the aftermath of the Boston fire. A member of the assembly interjected that “we
are all in distress! Gentlemen, this is a life struggle. One more such conflagration will strip this
country of every fire-insurance company.”13
After these great fires and the great loss of money, insurance companies finally began to
understand the problems that they had been cycling through over for the past decades. The vast
majority of smaller companies had disappeared. They proved to be neither money makers nor
12
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able to sustain losses due to fire. The larger companies that remained realized the problems that
they needed to tackle and what to do to improve their business. They sought to tackle these
problems through increasing knowledge about the workings of fire, fire prevention construction,
and oversight of firefighting departments.14
Insurance companies thought of legislation first. If the buildings burned too easily, then
the companies felt that it is the government’s duty to protect people from such dangerous
situations. It became more and more common to see restrictions on how and why a person could
use fire within city limits. Further limits on where wooden structures could be placed became
more and more prominent along with limits on the storage of hazardous materials in cities.
Legislation alone however proved a tool too slow to use in some cases. Insurance companies
realized the enormous power that they held in the rating schedules that they had created
throughout the first half of the century. If it became economically unfeasible to build and insure
a fireworks store in the middle of downtown New York, then it stands to reason that a fireworks
store will not be built there. Thus the role of the rating schedule shifted from one of a profit
saving tool, as it had been for the Insurance Company of North America, to one of a regulatory
tool. 15
Knowledge advanced the insurance business to its next level. Knowledge proved most
valuable when companies came together in boards and associations. Before the 1870s, and the
forming of the NFBU, fire insurance had been hugely primitive. There were many companies
that had established rating schedules and tried to identify higher risk. However, the vast majority
of smaller companies set rates on guesses and their greed. These companies would fall to the
14
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conflagrations; the industry needed to spread the science behind insurance. By the time the
NBFU came, around agents were known to talk and communicate with one another. Where one
might have learned a hard lesson they could then go and tell another agent what to do in a
situation. A prime example lay in a conversation between a young agent and an old one as told
by Brearley. The young agent saw a tall row of buildings made of stone and thought that since
they were made of stone they were a good building to insure. However, the older agent saw the
Mansard roof, responsible for burning Boston and helped the younger agent to change his mind.
It is these conversations that began to change insurance into a true science instead of a semiscientific art punctuated by gambling. 16
During the modernization of the fire departments, they themselves had their own colorful
history. They faced the same trials and tribulations that insurance companies grappled with. It is
during the departments’ changes after conflagrations that the insurance companies came to the
stark realization of just how tied to their profits firefighters were. They also realized that they
had the ability to cause more damage than they helped. It became evident in the failures of the
firemen in Boston and Chicago. When a city is burning and only one third of the fire fighting
force could be summoned with only a few horses, there is a problem. Further in Chicago though
the men faced exhaustion after two large fires in two days there were many reports of fire
fighters being drunk during the conflagration. Many insurance companies and the NBFU saw the
time ripe to step in. 17
The evolution of fire companies is one that is slow and always will be. The idea is that
firemen do not enjoy change. However, they always have to change to improve. The insurance
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company can play a large role in encouraging change. The NFBU in particular set out to
transform the fire department. The first problem lay in equipment. There could never again be a
situation such as Boston’s. Using the tool of rate control the NBFU convinced cities around the
country to upgrade. When cities saw that rates came down with better protection, it became one
of their primary policies to make sure that their fire departments were adequately equipped. In
1866 at the forming of the board, only fifteen cites had new steam powered fire engines. Ten
years later nearly 275 cities could use the engines. 18
After equipment had been established, cities needed people to staff it. The NBFU made a
precedent to demand paid fire departments. In Chicago the organization stated simply to the city
officials that if they did not provide an adequate force for fire prevention then the NBFU would
not insure any building in Chicago. Effectively the board threatened to take nearly all of
Chicago’s fire insurance from it. Chicago promptly complied. Lastly in 1889 the NBFU made an
organization to oversee these departments and to make sure that they followed up to the standard
that the insurance companies wanted to see. The board’s expert evaluated the “condition and the
present needs of fire departments and fire facilitates throughout the country.” Thus with the new
men, new equipment, and oversight, the insurance companies took a step toward higher
integration between firemen and agents. 19
The problems that insurance faced were being dealt with, yet the companies still had ever
evolving problems. The world always changes, and with change the insurance companies were
forced to adjust. Electricity would become one of the most significant change for the world and
the insurance industry. In the late 1880s the insurance sector began to straighten out after the
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disasters of the 1870s yet a new development caused new problems. The invention of electricity
heralded the ending of the 19th century and drew the 20th century closer. But when electric power
began to go into wide use, insurance claims rose at an astronomical rate. Many believed that only
fraudulent arson could cause such a spike in fires and claims. One employee of the NBFU noted
that “we cannot assume that the most reputable merchants have all at once become criminals. We
find that our better class of risk is burning in a greater ratio than ever before and that there are
mysterious causes at work.” It became apparent that these mysterious fires were from the misuse
and incorrect installation of the new element of electricity.

20

To combat the new electrical force, the NBFU again jumped at being in the front for
protecting insurance companies’ assets. The establishment of an Electrical Bureau to determine
the severity of and solutions to the problems of electricity helped. The difficulty of the bureau’s
task proved too great to be tackled by one entity alone. Thus the NBFU looked to help establish a
full-fledged independent organization to ensure that electricity and other dangerous products
were handled in a safe way. In 1896 the board helped to create an organization that spanned over
a hundred years and still affects fire safety today. That organization is the National Fire
Protection Agency, or NFPA. The NFPA investigated the dangers of electricity originally, but it
also played crucial roles in other areas. The NFPA concerned itself with investigating the use of
new fire sprinklers inside buildings, the validity of fire proofing doors, and disbursement of fire
extinguishers. With a new organization leading the way, the conflagrations on the scale of
Chicago and Boston faded farther and farther into the past. 21
The last major step in safety improvement that the insurance companies took is one that

20

Ibid, 36

21

Mark Tebeau, 252; Harry Brearley, 89

20

they had worked toward for some time. Safety inspections finally became something that proved
economical for the insurance industry. Most companies that survived the era of conflagrations
since their founding had been inspecting their risks prior to taking on the risk. Yet many
homeowners could clean up for an agent only to return to their ways. Thus in 1904 the
companies decided to take further action. The municipal inspection system began to take shape.
The inspectors from the national board of fire underwriters could look at a city and advise the
city planners on laws to institute and steps to take to make the city safer. What these inspectors
looked at were structures, firefighting and water supply. Each area had its own specific interests.
Structure inspections looked at building techniques, materials and most importantly the spacing
of structures. At the same time a fire fighting inspector would evaluate a city’s readiness to
extinguish fires that did start. The water inspector took the final task of making sure the
availability of water stayed constant and that the pipes were large enough to support fire
suppression. The maintenance in these three areas proved critical for fire safety in a city. With
the fire insurance companies inspecting them the room for failure became less likely. 22
San Francisco would become the greatest test to the fire insurer’s new methods. Their
response and preparation for a new threat is what cements these new techniques that had been
established since the 1870’s into the fire insurance tool box for the coming century. The
insurance industry found itself on the edge of the largest and most costly conflagration. On April
18, 1906, San Francisco suffered an early morning quake. The city had risen in the last few
decades after the gold rush in California in the mid 1800’s and the success of America’s war
against Mexico. The population reached nearly half a million at the time of the quake. At 5:15
A.M. the city’s residents were awoken to the noise and motion of a quake that lasted only for one
22
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minute. The quake itself did not last long and lacked significant power. Many buildings, though
damaged, remained standing. The business district is the only district that suffered significant
quake damage. The land that the buildings stood on had been reclaimed, and so the structures all
lost their integrity on the weak ground. Yet, when the dust from the quake settled, the toll of the
disaster had not even begun. Shortly following the tremor nearly fifty fires started in various
places in the city. The firefighters, though a valiant and well trained force, could not stop the
blazes in time to check their spread. Their failure stemmed largely from the lack of water. The
majority of the water mains in the city cracked under the strain of the shifting earth. With no
water to drench the flames the heat quickly spread. After four days only rain could fully
extinguish the flames.23
The flames consumed $235 million of insurance loss and $350 million of total estimated
loss. This monetary immensity challenged the underwriters in that it was the toughest burden
that insurance companies had ever had to bear. San Francisco had had the benefit of many of the
advances in underwriting. People said about San Francisco that it “violated all underwriting
traditions and precedents by not burning up” prior to the quake, many of the companies had
begun inspections to address this. Further the San Francisco Fire Department stood vigilant and
played a large role in keeping previous conflagrations from happening. Yet the city still burned
when extra forces such as the earthquake overcame the odds. The insurance industry found itself
in a difficult position. It faced the most amount of pay out there would ever have to pay at one
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time. The fear remained that hundreds of companies would go bankrupt and not be able to
provide for their policy holders as happened in the mid-1800s after Chicago. The facts stand
though that the policies of the NBFU and other insurance companies and agencies were
successful. Fewer and fewer companies had aggressively cut rates and more had kept cash on
hand in the fear of such a disaster. When the payouts had all been given, only twenty companies
went bankrupt after San Francisco; of those twenty the majority resumed business once they
could get back on their feet again, a resilience that the industry lacked during the Chicago and
Boston fires. In time, all those who filed claims received their due. The payout marked the
success the NBFU and other companies had worked for nearly forty years. 24
The insurance system is one that went through tremendous ups and downs. The system
suffered losses and failures. Yet, it managed to pick itself up again and adapt and change. Money
makes the world go around and insurance companies guarantee money in hard times. In doing so
the industry has been forced to adapt and become a resilient system. The facts of nature aside,
the insurance companies adapted to their changing environment. When conflagrations struck
they changed; when electricity came into popularity they worked with it. When the time came,
and their progress throughout the entire 19th century was checked by the most expensive fire in
history, they passed the test. Their success lay largely in part in the organizations like the NBFU
and the NFPA. These companies would go on to continue to influence insurance policy for years
to come. Their legacy and that of other companies like them is what makes the functions of
insurance companies of today flow as easily as they do. The understanding the tumult that the
insurance industry went through in the 19th century allows for a far greater understand of the
things that occur now in the 21st century.
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Chapter 2: From Parades to Paydays, Professionalization of The Fire Service
For hundreds of years people have insured against fire. Insurance, however, is not the
first line of defense against the destructive force of nature that is fire. Ever since Roman times
people have found ways to extinguish fire as soon as it starts. The history of fire fighting is one
that has changed dramatically since its inception. Today’s firefighters are covered head to toe in
protective gear and ride in high powered pumpers to the scene of a fire. In the past, the fire
service is marked by images of bucket brigades and hand pumped fire wagons dragged by the
same men who had to pump it. Yet with change came great upheaval. Fire fighting is an
institution that takes pride in what it is and where it has come from. It is often mused that today’s
modern fire departments are a service that is built on “250 years of tradition untouched by
progress.” The idea that a public safety organization will stick to old methods instead of
adapting and changing is an idea that has plagued the history of the fire service for generations.
This is the true story of the fire service. From its inception the fire service has strived to provide
the best safety for the people it serves, yet while trying to accomplish its ultimate goal the fire
service has also been trying to preserve its identity in its traditions.
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Fire is a force of nature. A law of the land that always has been and always will be. As
long as combustibles sublimate and discharge heat and light, there will always be fire. Humanity
has always strived to build. It is human nature to create things, things to live in and those that
humanity controls. These two facts of nature have always and will always clash. In the ancient
times the fire services lacked the complications of today. The Romans are credited with creating
many things that the modern world would come to cherish, among these is the fire service. The
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first organized fire service, founded in Rome, served its citizens thousands of years ago. The
service, though well founded lacked an essential effectiveness. A Roman firefighter lacked
pumped water, life safety equipment, and steel tools. It would not be until the 18th century that
the world would see the advent of the modern fire service.
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The world stood on the precipice of massive change. The industrial revolution began with
the 1700’s and heralded a dramatic change in every facet of human life including the fire service.
With the revolution came the growth of cities. With larger cities came the need for a new type of
fireman. For centuries when a building burned the men of the town would help the family the
best they could, but in the end most medieval villages were small enough that the risk of a large
fire remained under control. Now the people of Europe moved to work in factories. These new
larger cities faced a great risk of one fire devastating an entire town. Thus the modern fire service
took shape. Amsterdam started the first modern firefighting methods when it published an early
firefighting manual. However, in 1820 chief Braidwood of the newly formed Edinburgh fire
department in England started using firefighting methods that made the fire service a true
modern institution. The modernization included such things as a fire fighting manual, the first to
be published in English, and the standardization of hose. 27
The next innovation of the fire service would happen outside of Europe. The United
States had begun its experiment in freedom and democracy as the 19 th century dawned. In the
beginning came the prosperity of new opportunity in the land of limitless resources. Again just as
in Europe the rising population in cities demanded that a fire service be established to serve the
people safely. When America still paid taxes to England, the fire service in the new world began.
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The first volunteer fire company began in 1718 in Boston. The most influential of the early
volunteer fire companies resided in Philadelphia. That company embodied the ideals of its
founder Benjamin Franklin when it began running calls in 1736. 28
In these early times the shape of the fire service took did not emulate the class separation
and divisions that marked much of the rest of the country at the time. The idea of being a
volunteer in the fire service is an idea that has always transcended class. Though the toleration
for a man of a different race still followed the average American attitude of the time, there
abided a semblance of relative diversity. The diversity exemplified in the words of a St. Louis
fireman who said “merchants princes and clerks, professional men and loafers…threw aside
whatever they were doing as soon as the alarm bell sounded.” When these volunteer
organizations were beginning the men who joined these departments tried to exemplify the
pervasive idea of masculinity. Thus working class men held their idea of masculinity as one that
needed to be proved regularly. While on the other side the upper class gentlemen still felt a need
to assert their bravado in a way that did not always present themselves in polite Victorian era
society. The need for masculinity largely drove these men’s needs to join and stay in the early
volunteer departments.29
Masculinity played an important role while the commitment to the community and sense
of citizenship provided further encouragement. Service and citizenship is an idea that spread
throughout the country in the 19th century. The new nation had a lot to be proud of as it grew and
began to secure its foothold. The importance of contributing to the growth of the nation became
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greater. Thus when a young man joined a volunteer fire department he also joined the band of
citizens. The volunteer firemen largely saw what they did as a way that they gave back to the
community and secured a citizenship that they earned. 30
The last major aspect that the fire department provided for the men who volunteered for
them in the first half of the 19th century is a sense of community. It is easy for people in the
modern world to forget what the world is like without the social trappings of today’s media. Yet
in the 1800’s people needed a community. For many young unmarried men the fire station
provided that community. Many had just moved to these new cities as they tried to escape the
vicious cycle of the agricultural society. Looking for work and not knowing many people led to a
willingness to join these volunteer departments that offered a sense of camaraderie that didn’t
exist in most environments.31
These new departments grew as their cities grew. The American volunteer fire system
became a thing that America could claim as uniquely its own. No other system in the world
developed in the way that the American fire service had. These institutions became praised. Of
course any group of people that sacrifice to save lives is worthy of praise, however, the praise of
the fire service at the time bordered on the extent of worship. The fire department in a sense
could do no wrong. The media made praise a priority thus affecting how people saw their fire
fighter and how insurance companies interacted with them and embraced the volunteers as they
themselves began business. 32
The media is an institution that in itself has served various purposes throughout history.
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The mid 1800 saw journalism gain a place as a major influencer of people’s thoughts. The media
felt it necessary to particularly influence opinion on the fire service. The fire service could not
have been by any means a perfect institution. The people in these volunteer departments were
just that, people, they made mistakes like any other person would. Yet angelic is not how the
media portrayed them. These men who pumped water onto the urban fires of the 1840’s and 50’s
found themselves being portrayed as almost perfect examples of citizenship and sacrifice.
Examples lay in prints that were created of firemen of the time. Currier and Ives at the time
created some of the most well know picture printing service. They are most famous for their
cheap prints that were well circulated. In the 1840’s they began to portray what they wanted
people to perceive of the fire departments. The prints that were created were not the typical run
of the mill action scenes. These prints embodied the heroism of the firemen. The American
fireman, facing the Enemy printed by the artist Louis Maurier embodied how these prints over
idealized the fireman. Greenburg describes how in the print the “Fireman is handsome, manly,
and despite his exertions, clean…. His pose is similar to that of Napoleon, Lafayette or
Washington.” Firemen were certainly heroes but the way the prints of the time made them look
they were more than that, they could do no wrong, and were even angelic. The prints were not
the only places in the media that the firemen garnered praise. The newspapers of the time found
excellent use in praising the work of the firemen. The New York Times offers some insight into
what praise looked like for the fireman. When reporting the financial losses of large stores in
Nashville, Tennessee, the paper mentions only that the Firemen had “Acted Nobly” giving them
only praise.33
The way the public interacted with the firemen again highlights the volunteer fireman’s
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ability to stir up zeal. There are countless accounts of parades thrown in the honor of volunteer
firemen. In 1852 nearly 25 companies converged on Philadelphia forming a line of nearly six
thousand men that stretched for four hours. The parade even stopped to fight a fire at one point
which the paper made no effort to comment on how the firemen could have been standing by
instead of parading. These acts were not confined events. Just as in Philadelphia, New York had
a similar parade for no other reason than to celebrate the construction of a new firemen’s hall.
These parades became such prolific parts of the personality of a city that when foreign
dignitaries would come to a town they would be greeted with none other than a fireman’s parade.
All of these Media exaggerations and extravagant parades for firemen produced a certain idea
about what a volunteer fireman stood for in the eyes of the average citizen. A volunteer in that
time was put on such a pedestal that when they did almost anything they were met with highest
praise. The greatest example of how they received such praise lay in the same paper clipping that
described the fire in Nashville. The paper may have described the firemen in good terms,
however, what makes the article stand out are the last two sentences on the article. What these
sentences tell is of how a man whose house the firemen saved and the bank awarded large sums
of money to the firemen for their service. The reward to a fireman is something that could never
stand today but at the time almost came to be expected.34
The idea of rewarding the volunteer firemen for their service is an idea that began to take
root in more ways than one. Most importantly insurance companies also began to reward
firemen. Insurance companies have always held sway over the cities and the businesses that they
ensure. Their monetary leverage allowed them to effect varying decisions. The power that they
controlled played a particularly important role in the fire service at a crucial time. The public and
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media praise of firemen could not last forever and the role of insurance companies in marking a
shift in the thinking is a dramatic one. Insurance company stayed just as loyal to their volunteers
as news reporters of the time were. Some insurance companies at first began to use the fire mark
as a way to reward and encourage firemen. The fire mark, a symbol of a particular fire insurance
company, could be placed on an insured building. In doing so companies thought that, in seeing
the mark, the firemen would be encouraged to save more property if they knew that they may
receive reparations from a particular insurance agency. Rewards began to be issued for the first
fire company on scene to a fire insured by particular companies. A system that may have seemed
like a good idea ultimately doomed itself to failure. There were obvious problems. Firemen
would go to fires with no regard to safety and fight over who arrived first while the building
burned. Such actions would eventually lead to the dethroning of the volunteer fireman in the eyes
of the public and lead to the most dramatic shift in fire department history. 35
The fireman assumed the role of the hero in the 1850’s. Yet, he did not receive the role of
the average everyman hero like he may have today. Rather the image of haloed a strongman
fighting the demonic fire emerged. Popular culture of the time is very interesting. The
antebellum period is a time when so much growth took place. Cities sprang from farms, and
towns became the infants of today’s metro areas. All of the fast growth did wonders, but at the
same time created a fear in many people. In a large city that lacked a fire code at the time the
threat of the entire city burning to the ground hung on the minds of everyone who lived there.
The reality remained that people needed something to believe in, they needed to think that
something stood between them and the hellish annihilation of a large fire. Thus near worship of
the volunteer fireman sprang up. It is a simple fact that “there was often nothing realistic about
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the accounts of fireman’s exertions” yet they remained the “nobler and more powerful foe” in the
fight against fire in the eyes of the media. Fire has always been seen as an almost occult evil, in
order to sleep at night the people needed to believe in an angelic force equipped to fight the evil.
The status quo could not last forever. The insurance agency faced hard times as the great fires of
the midcentury forced companies to restructure and reprioritize or fail. So too would the fire
service have to undergo similar changes. The end of the volunteer fire service in the major city
knocked on the door as the country began to look to the second half of the 19 th century. The way
the media viewed the volunteer companies changed as did the public’s regard for their former
heroes. The reasoning lay in the violence of the volunteer companies, whether perceived or a
reality, and the money that insurance companies faced to lose. These factors ushered in the era of
the paid fire fighter. 36
Though firemen were praised, and they were representative by many classes, they
became a violent organization in the 1850’s and 60’s. There are countless examples in news
reports of firemen getting into brawls. These quarrels could arise from something as trivial as
two different cities in an antagonistic rivalry as happened between Philadelphia and New York in
the fall of 1858. The young men of Philadelphia who happened to visit New York were met with
fists as the New Yorkers assaulted them. Yet, fights also could arise for trivial circumstances, in
1852 a Philadelphia fireman suffered a gunshot and another a stabbing at a fire. These fights
could range in size from small occurrences to larger riots as is evident in the incident that
occurred in September of 1856. Two opposing fire companies met on Duane Street in New York
and proceeded to induce a violent brawl where stones and bricks flew through the air. The police
once involved were even pelted with the missiles. The 2 hour long fight did not break up until
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nearly 40 armed police descended upon the area. The depiction of these firemen had made a
dramatic shift both in content and in style. No longer were they the heroes that saved houses.
Now they were fighters that were described as “half-Drunken ‘fellars’.” The shift in the media’s
portrayal of the fireman is a very important one. Volunteer firemen in particular depended
greatly on the public’s belief in them. When the media shifted its position on what they saw the
firemen as, then soon the public would lose favor as well. The public began to see firemen as
hooligans, and they associated them with street gangs even. An example lays in the notorious
“Killers” a group of young men who held zealous political beliefs and bordered on terrorism in
midcentury Philadelphia held lose connections to a volunteer fire company in the city.
Throughout the nation even if these connections to gangs could not be proven, a group of young
men prone to fighting found it increasingly difficult to debunk such a myth. A switch in thinking
takes time, however the time it took is far shorter than might be thought. The time it took for
condemnations to filter down and inevitably rupture the volunteer department is short by many
other social change timeframes. 37
The insurance companies furthered contributed to the downfall of the volunteer system.
With the insurance companies awarding rewards for the successful extinguishing fires trouble
inevitably abounded. The obvious arguments between different companies to see who would
receive the largest reward occurred, which led to more violence. Yet there were further
repercussions that were unseen. Many fire companies started down a dark path of theft at fire
scenes, which in turn led to the creation of fire wardens and insurance patrols. These
organizations under the payroll of the insurance companies were tasked with saving as much
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property from fire as possible. These jobs provided extra expense for insurance companies. The
companies needed reform and a new system. Yet the municipalities saw paid fire departments as
expensive endeavors, even if they knew that their practicality lay in the Jacksonian era. It
became the job of the insurance man to make a paid professional fire department a cost effective
investment for a municipality. With the “increased value placed on the material interest of
property owners in the municipal governments” the insurance man’s job became an easy one.
The pressure of insurance companies and the public both contributed to the down fall of the
urban volunteer fire fighter. When the new recruits of the Baltimore paid firefighting department
were given fourteen suggestions on fire ground operations five of those suggestions were solely
focused on the saving of property. 38
By the 1870’s the paid fire department with the steam engine reigned supreme. It had
become a symbol of being a new and prosperous city. The war had ended and America in a way
took on a new national identity. There very much persisted the idea of new ness and prosperity
throughout the north and rebuilding throughout the south. Thus, when a township could boast
that it had a paid fire service then it could claim proper city hood. In December of 1866 San
Francisco bid farewell to the last volunteer fire department in a major metropolitan area. The age
of the volunteer had ended and the modern era of the fire service had begun. 39
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Chapter 3: Contemporary Problems Facing Firemen and Insurance Underwriters.
Fire fighting since the inception of the paid fire fighting force has changed dramatically.
There are no longer horse drawn carriages as there were in the late 1800’s. Yet in a way it has
changed very little. The way that insurance companies have affected fire departments has
changed very little since the massive shift form volunteer to paid forces. The fact remains simply
that insurance companies stand to make a profit. They have instituted different measures to do so
more effectively yet, their influence on a fire department has always held that motive behind it.
Insurance companies and fire departments have thus traveled through time in much the same
way. Technology has made things more efficient as it has with all aspects of life but the
relationship at heart remains unchanged. For that reason there are many issues in the fire service
today that are incredibly important in understanding the way that the fire service has been shaped
since midcentury of the 1900’s. There is the important question of poverty and fire, the growing
risk of wildfire, and the decline of the rural volunteer system, and the future of fire service.
Wild fires are a pervasive threat. Arguably the wild fire is the first threat from the force
of nature that is fire that humanity ever faced. No other fire threat however is accelerating at
quite the rate that wild fires are. The world is facing a changing foe. The severity of wildfires is
increasing yearly in monetary terms and in occurrence. The reasoning for an increase lay in the
lack of fuel control and the increasing interactions between people and the higher risk rural parts
of the country. The risk factors that have contributed to increase of fires are factors that largely
can be mitigated. Yet unlike evolution of structural fire safety both insurance companies and fire
departments the problem of wild land fires has not been addressed on a solvable level.
The causes of a wild fire are various. There can be something as simple as a cigarette butt
not stamped out to cause a fire that consumes thousands of acres. Yet the current situation did
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not always represent how the world worked. Before human expansion through the entire globe it
is believed that wildfires were far more frequent than today. Since the founding of America these
fires have caused as much trouble for insurers and home owners as structural fires have. Yet
recently the problem of the wild fire has stepped up in the minds of many. The wild fire has not
become more prevalent because of the vastness or record setting performances, however. The
larges wild fires could have been seen in the 20th century but not today. In 1938 the country
faced 232,000 fires that destroyed 33.8 million acres. Such daunting numbers when compared to
the fires that occurred in the late 20th century seem massive. In 1996 the country only suffered
from 113,000 wildfires that burned 6.4 million acres. These fires seem fractional compared to
their predecessors. The nature of the problem does not lie in these fires size but rather in the
damage that they do. The cost that a fire does in insurable property is indicative of what the wild
fire is becoming today. In 1978 a single average fire in the Los Angles area cost 53 million
dollars. By the mid 90’s these numbers jumped through the roof with costs shooting to 407
million dollars. Fires are costing people more money and are doing more damage than they ever
have before.40
The reasons for the shift are very specific. Fire in the natural world serves a purpose; it
clears the land and allows for old growth to be replaced by new growth. When these natural fires
get in the way people have always extinguished them to protect their land. The continuing cycle
has created an interesting dynamic that contributes the greater destructive power of fires. In
many areas in the western United States it has been determined through analysis of tree rings that
fire frequency has changed from once every ten years to only one every 300 years. With less
fires occurring covering less area due to extinguishment, there is more and more unburned fuel
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available for a fire to consume. The effect is that more fuel could allow a fire to “burn with such
ferocity that it would destroy a forest that had experienced countless benign ignitions during past
centuries”. Because the fuel is more prevalent the intensity of these fires is much higher. The
intensity is important because the NFPA states that the single greatest contributing factor to a
structure catching fire in a wild fire is the intensity at which the fire burns. 41
These fires are having an increasingly dramatic effect as they become more intense. In
Australia 552 people have been killed in the last 100 years by wild fires. The human cost is far
from the only effect that fires have on people. Property loss is another major effect that wild fires
have. Many people have shifted to higher risk areas. In the United States the most destructive
wildfires are typically in the western part of the country. Between 1900 and 1996 the western
half of the states has seen a 477% increase in population. States such as California have seen a
2000 percent increase in their population. Not all of these people are moving to cities either.
There is data that suggest that the concentration of people per square mile is falling in the
western United States. With suburban areas comingling with the wildernesses that general
produce massive fires the threat of losing a home to a wild fire has increased. Further these high
intensity fires are beginning to cause other problems. Air quality has been a concern for many for
the last few decades. With the high intensity fires burning more fuel they create more smoke.
With greater smoke many people are beginning to notice respiratory problems in fire prone
areas. If these problems weren’t enough a fire in an area can dramatically affect the quality of
water. The PH and chemical makeup can be radically altered as the ash and heat affect streams
and lakes in and around a fire area. With all of these problems becoming a more and more
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frequent occurrence some have looked to find ways to lessen the fire impact. 42
The responses to these new types of high intensity wild fires have been various. If fuel is
the problem for these intense fires then it stands to reason that reducing the fuel load would
reduce these fires. The way that that has been done in the past is through prescribed burning.
What prescribed burning entails is that a state or a land owner can take their land and prepare it
to where a fire can be well contained, and then light a controlled fire. The result is that the fire
burns these excessive amounts of fuel to a level that coincides with how many forest have been
in the past. The main problem that the fire service and insurance companies face is that the
practice is expensive and very cost prohibitive in many instances. The labor needed to clear the
land effectively enough to make a controlled fire safe is simply too great in some instances.
Further hindering efforts to reduce fuel levels is the skepticism that many people have. Home
owners are reluctant to start a fire on their property in order to simply prevent another. 43
If land clearing is too cost prohibitive insurance companies are beginning to look into
other ways to minimize their loss in these fires. Simple education of the proper way to maintain
land in a fire safe way has been shown to decrease the rate of housing loss. Studies have been
done on the effect of simply clearing land around structures. If a house has a non-wood roof and
30 feet of defensible space around it then there is a 90% probability that it will survive a wild
fire. Educating people on important land management is becoming a more important aspect to
solving the problem. 44
The fire insurance companies will continue to lose revenue as these fires affect more and
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more people. Ultimately the insurance companies and fire service will have to work together
again like they have in the past to begin to mitigate what has been happening in the western part
of the county. As more and more people move to higher risk areas and the problem of unburnt
fuel compounds these wildfires will continue to burn at more and more destructive levels.
Poverty is a problem that affects many aspects of life. America faces everyday a more
and more difficult situation when it comes to its people and poverty. The study of how the
problem of poverty affects the nation as a whole is a topic that has been raked over time and time
again. The correlation between poverty and fire is rarely touched on. In his autobiography,
Dennis Smith, a New York fire fighter expresses what he thought about the problem of inner city
poverty and fire. He tells that he will “never escape from tenements and cockroaches. The names
and geography may change, but the conditions are universal when people are without money.”
Smith fought fire in the heyday of 20th century fire fighting, and his memoir is full of musings on
why he saw so much fire in poverty stricken areas. The correlation between fire and poverty is
one that has been studied and proven. Yet the problem does not go away. Fire insurance and fire
departments alike have to face the problem. For years the fire insurer simply has refrained from
insuring those in lower income areas. The inflexibility of the insurance rating schedule simply
does not allow for a company to insure such risks and then still make a profit. The answer to the
question of how to address the problem is a vague one largely because the problem is so wide
spread and seemingly insurmountable. It isn’t simply the lack of money that contributes to these
fires. Rather it is a culmination of factors that generally exist in low income areas. Some factors
include lack of education, dilapidated housing, lack of parental supervision and lack of home
owner ship. The problem of poverty and fire cannot be fully addressed until each issue is dealt
with. Firefighters will continue to have to put themselves in harm’s way fighting fires in poor
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dilapidated areas until public policy addresses the underlying cause of these injustices. 45
The paid fire department took hold in cities 150 years ago. A paid fire department
however is an expensive endeavor. Not all of the communities in the country can afford them.
Lack of funding makes it necessary to still have volunteer fire departments in many parts of the
country. The volunteer fire department is facing its own struggles that will need to be addressed
if the people they serve are to continue to have effective fire coverage. Dropping numbers are
causing volunteer departments problems that will force them in the future to reevaluate their
situation. The number of active volunteers hovers somewhere around 750,000 people. These
members face challenges that paid fire fighters do not have. A volunteer must work another job
and be able to manage the training that is intensive of fire fighting along with balancing family
friends and other obligations. As the demands on fire fighters increase with newer standards on
training the volunteer pool is dropping. The fire service is again changing. Some say that the
second era of the volunteer is coming to a close. As the volunteers of the cities ceased their
service so too will the rural volunteers are no more by the close of the 21 st century. 46
The fire service is facing the challenge with the emergence of the combination
department. A combination department is a department where some of the responders are paid
members guaranteed to be at every call, while another portion of the department remains
volunteers. There generally are four configurations to these departments based on the
surrounding area. These four types include; simple previously volunteer, simple previously
career, complex previously volunteer, and the complex previously career. Each of these types
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exists in areas with certain needs. A simple previously volunteer department usually comes from
an area that is rural and cannot finance a full time paid department yet is prosperous and thus
tries to insure that its citizens will always have a response when they call 911 by adding paid
staff. On the other hand a simple previously career department spring up in towns that are facing
downturns, they formally had full time paid positions but the city does not have the money to
replace people as they retire. All of these types of departments have the same problems that
again do not face a paid department. These may include animosity between each section of the
department paid and volunteer. Further paid members of combination departments generally lack
formal labor contracts and are not unionized. Thus tensions can run high unless the right kind of
leadership exists. These are the problems that the fire service faces as it grows and changes yet
again. 47
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Chapter 4: A View From The Courthouse: Insurance and Fire Services in Lafayette County, MS.
Insurance companies had to learn the hard lesson in their history that a company cannot
take risk without being able to pay for it. Fire departments had to learn that tradition could not
out pace safety and sometimes; to provide the best service, the old ways have to go. These
lessons were both hard learned and well kept. Because of the past that both fire insurance and
fire departments have gone through, more fire departments and insurance regulation agencies
have made decisions that try to avoid the mistakes of their predecessors. Particularly, the local
fire departments and insurance regulation in Mississippi have struggled with many of the same
historical problems that faced the nation. Mississippi has been described as a state that is
inseparable with its past. By looking at the fire institution, both in departments and insurance
companies alike, the connection with the past is evident. Residing in just one north Mississippi
county there is a volunteer department that is slowly transitioning to a combination, and a paid
full-time department. Even a long gone department that fell prey to the constraints of money
formerly called the area its home. Each of these departments has learned its own lessons that
reflect the larger lessons that many fire departments faced in history. Just like the departments
themselves the insurance situation in Mississippi made adaptations that not only make it unique
to the rest of the country, but also make it an entity that in its own right has many more problems
to face. 48
The history of the fire service ranges from paid to part time and to full volunteer. The
community surrounding Oxford and Lafayette County is served by departments that have flowed
with the times while maintaining the traditions that all fire departments have tried to save
throughout history. The county has enjoyed the presence of three fire departments, two still in
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existence and one that has disbanded. These three departments are the Oxford Fire department,
the Lafayette County Fire Department, and the University Fire Department. Each institution has
its own specific set of values history and struggles. The way that each copes with the various
struggles that they faced throughout their lifetime gives a look into how the everyday
departments deals with the same types of problems that have plagued fire departments for
centuries.
The Lafayette County Fire Department is an institution that mimics much of what the
early volunteer departments of the mid 1800s did. However, in many ways it has learned from
the lessons that those departments taught. Largely its organization has allowed it to form in a
way that would prevent many of the problems that faced urban 19th century departments. The
department had humble beginnings. Initially the area surrounding the town of Oxford fell
completely under the protection of the city of Oxford Fire Department. Difficulty responding to
outlying areas proved the city’s coverage to be subpar for protecting citizens. The department
simply covered too large of an area. It could take nearly forty minutes to reach the edge of the
county from the city center. The situation needed to change. The Civil Defense Force
established during World War II saw an opportunity to take more of a role on protecting citizens
from the more everyday threat. Many of the members wanted continue the duty to the
community even though the war had ended and the Cold War seemed distant to the Mississippi
farm belt. Thus with almost natural prerogative in 1977 the Civil Defense force spearheaded a
movement to establish a county Volunteer Fire Department. 49
Bob Foster stepped into the picture. The Civil Defense director for Lafayette County saw
the desperate need to expand the fire protection for the county and create a viable response closer
to home. The citizens had a need and it so happened that the county had been saving away
49

Otis Anderson (Volunteer Fireman) in discussion with the author, September 18, 2013.

43

money that had been rebated to it by insurance companies over the years for just such a time.
Thus the LCFD came to be, to serve the citizens better through fire protection and to decrease
their insurance rates. 50
The essence of a fire department centers around the same main things that the insurance
companies focus on: manning, equipment and water supply. The department started with none
of these in the early years. The first members saw their main prerogative as one of helping the
people and then filling the needs of the insurance companies second. Their helping spirit and
lack of funds limited the firefighting apparatus that the LCFD had access to. Rather than buy a
real truck, the County allowed the department to procure two old gravel trucks. The early
members then drove the old trucks to Corinth, Mississippi. After fitting them with homemade
tanks and water pumps, they returned with impromptu fire apparatus. Originally fitted with
tanks that could hold 1600 gallons or six and a half tons of water, the newly refurbished trucks
had to be modified to hold less once they returned from Corinth. The trucks simply could not
effectively carry the massive weight in emergency situations. To house the two new trucks the
county constructed two stations, one in the north to service the national forest and one in the
south. Further, Harmontown, a settlement in the northwest corner of the county across a lake,
had a fire engine of its own made from a military surplus M-35 2.5 ton military cargo truck.
These became the first 3 companies of the LCFD . 51
The department created for itself trucks, but it needed the people. In those days whenever
a fire burned, “everyone went.” In the first few years the department grew rapidly to nearly 30
people in the county. The way that the department grew lay in the word of mouth spread of its
existence. When young men heard the sirens and asked “where they were going,” they shortly
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found themselves signed up. Much like volunteers of the past, people in the community wanted
to give back and feel a sense of citizenship towards their home. The department did not lack for
people because the community camaraderie that held strong in rural Lafayette county. The
members of the department handled their response with the technology that they had. With only
two radios, the common dispatching technology today, most dispatching went out via phone tree.
The member assigned to the radio that day would receive the emergency dispatch and then
telephone everyone on their unit. This duty soon became the duty of the wife as most firemen did
not want to wait after the alarm woke then and generally rushed out without making any calls. 52
Since that time, LCFD has made a slow evolutionary progress. The old tactics of spraying
water until the trucks are empty has been replaced with the idea of water shuttle. The idea
stemmed from the need of water in a rural community that lacks fire hydrants. When one truck
arrived, the next would go back and forth from the fire to the nearest water source to provide the
firemen with water. Communications have improved to the point where the department is on the
verge of switching to Mississippi’s new digital statewide system. None of these changes came
about in a single epiphany. All of these new things did not happen overnight. Each change that
the department has today has come about in a slow methodical way with no one event causing
drastic revision in either tactics or technology. 53
Such a slow pattern contradicts the history of most of the urban volunteer departments of
the 19th century. Those departments had to make radical jumps from man-pulled hand pumps to
horse drawn steam engines, then again from volunteer to paid departments. A large part of the
later shift lay in the violence that erupted between rival companies. LCFD wanted to avoid the
problem all together. When Bob Foster authored the articles of incorporation in 1977 he made a
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simple point. Instead of each local community in the county having its own independent
volunteer department LCFD became a unified institution. Unity violates the norm in most rural
departments today and pre 20th century urban departments, The significance of the system is that
each station throughout the county is under the jurisdiction of one chief and administratively
under the jurisdiction of one fire board that makes larger decisions. Infighting from one company
to another about who has the right to fight a fire in a certain area has been cut to zero, solving a
major problem that the early urban volunteers faced. Another positive to the LCFD organization
is tackling the retention rate of volunteers problem that the country is beginning to face. Further
with less petty squabbles the county and those that issue federal grants for equipment can see the
LCFD as a solid investment. All of these contribute as proof that the organization that LCFD
chose is one that would stand strong in hard times. 54
What is largely seen as the tipping point for the department occurred in the year 1988.
The county government prepared itself to spend $200,000 to begin garbage truck operations
outside of the city limits. Art Littlejohn, an advocate of the county firemen, convinced the
county government that the money would be more wisely used for LCFD. The money in
conjunction with state grant money allowed the department to purchase seven fire trucks with
turnout gear and breathing apparatus. No longer did the firemen have to settle with refurbished
gravel trucks but rather now fought fire with a genuine apparatus and equipment.
Lafayette County did not automatically become exempt to all the problems that faced
volunteer departments when it adopted its unique style of management. It still faced hurdles. One
of the most difficult hurdle being the replacement of Bob Foster as chief. In the early 1990’s Bob
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Foster had been chief of the department since its birth in 1977. All officers in the department to
that point except for him had been elected. The controversy grew when many members wished
for Bob Foster’s position to become an elected one. Many disagreed. In the end it took one
hundred members with resignations in hand to convince the chief to step down and alloy the
chief to become an elected position. However the strength of the organization of the county’s
particular style of volunteer department truly shined. Such a controversy could have conceivably
broken up the departments of urban volunteers in the 1800’s. However, the new 20 th century
style of organization proved to be strong enough to withstand such tumult.

55

By no means is such as system a perfect system; LCFD is far from it. It is a rural
volunteer department with all of the challenges that are faced by such a system . Many members
have driven a truck, pumped the truck, and fought fire all while totally alone. Further there are
many accounts of fire alarms that go unchecked because of lack of response by nearby
volunteers, only to find that there is an actual fire. Even though the homeowners still meet their
would-be heroes with hugs and gratitude, they do not know how close they came to not having
anyone come when called upon. These are problems that the department will have to face as it
goes forward. Even the most committed volunteer cannot be on call twenty-four hours out of
every day. 56
To deal with such problems the 21st century LCFD has adopted a combination
department model. As of now it remains a mostly volunteer based system. Less than ten percent
of the 150 members of the department are paid part time employees. However, the system is in
place to expand as the needs of the county grow and the reliance is placed higher on better
response to calls. The future of the department is to be decided as the expansion continues. The
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question is if it can survive the modernization and increasing of paid staff or will it succumb to
the same issues that plagued the urban fire service in their transition?
The University of Mississippi is an integral part of the community of Oxford.
Without its presence the town would simply not be the same. The town would not even exist in
any capacity near to what it is now. The University during the school months is, in essence, a
city in itself. There are restaurants and students, those that live on campus and those that
commute. The daytime population is one that exceeds many communities throughout
Mississippi. Thus it is inevitable that the question of fire protection is raised. The University has
made an attempt to provide the best service that it can to the students and faculty throughout the
years. It has inadvertently created a history of fire protection on the campus that has all three
types of departments. volunteer, combination, and full time city fire protection. In doing so the
University has the unique opportunity to know the strengths and weaknesses of all three types,
both in their fire safety and in their monetary aspects.
The original University Fire Department operated as a volunteer institution. When the
University grew to a large enough size to need a full time maintenance crew the fire suppression
responsibility ultimately fell under their jurisdiction on a volunteer basis. Those that volunteered
and worked during the day dropped what they worked on to go fight whatever fire that flared up
on campus. At night those that tended the boilers located directly across from the first station
took the responsibility of providing fire protection. At its peak the volunteers numbered near
fifty and had two trucks, a 1940’s model ford pumper and a World Lafrance airport truck, since
the University owns the nearest airport. 57
Yet, the system could not be sustained. While the majority of the volunteer members of
UFD worked on campus during the day, response time remained good. At night however even
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with the boiler room workers, the responses suffered. Thus the University made the decision to
improve the situation. 1980 marked the year that the University made a switch. They began a
combination department. Unlike what the county does now the University employed a full time
paid staff. The station remained manned by three men for a full twenty four hours a day 365 days
a year. Differing from many other paid fire departments the shifts worked not in a 24-hour on 48
hours off cycle but rather a eight day cycle of two sets of 24-hour on then 24-hours off followed
by four full days off. The department kept its contingent of volunteers, in case an incident proved
too formidable for the paid staff. Most instances, however, the staff handled. At its height the
school paid 10 full time employees, nine shift fireman and a fire chief. 58
With the new staffing the University had to be able to furnish the equipment with the
men. UFD annexed the old volunteer station and in doing so filled it with two pumpers that it
could use to run calls. The first, a 1974 engine, the second, a 1967 pumper, each provided good
service despite their age. A ¾-ton squad truck also allowed UFD to respond to smaller incidents.
The airport truck remained in the ownership and service of the University however it became
manned by the Oxford Fire Department; the response to the airport from their station would be
shorter. The newer truck could pump up to 1000 gallons a minute while the older could only
pump at 750 gallons a minute. Both trucks however could only hold 750 gallons of water which
is not very much by today’s standards. To compensate these trucks carried much more hose
making them capable of hooking up to fire hydrants at great distances.
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The UFD ultimately would not follow the same path that LCFD would. The path from
volunteer to paid did not ensure the department’s longevity. The department faced the major
problem of maintaining its relevance. UFD responded to all calls in the University. However if
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the call proved major OFD usually came to the University’s aide under an informal mutual aid
agreement. If the City of Oxford ever had a difficult fire then the University would respond.
Thus in the mid-eighties only a few years after the department’s inception the question arose if it
still held pertinence. The University set itself on a path of change and growth. To do so the UFD
would be forced to grow which would cost the school much more money. Thus in 1986 the UFD
made its last call and the OFD from thenceforth covered the University’s call load. 60
The City of Oxford is an interesting place. It has been described as an island in the area
of Mississippi. It has always drawn a different type of person than the typical southern
conservative. The island phenomenon is largely due to the University’s presence. With the
students and professors and all the staff that help make the school a possibility, the City of
Oxford has been larger than the average rural Mississippi town for some time and full of
different people. Because of the larger size and the ever changing needs of a college town, OFD
has been one that has changed widely over the years. Vacillating from paid to volunteer to paid
in its early years it emerged into the second half of the 20 th century as a professional force. As
the 21st century continues the department faces many of the same challenges as LCFD and UFD
both had to cope with.
The early history of OFD is one that is shrouded in mystery. Much of the record on the
early formation of the department has become lost or not kept. In the minutes of the Oxford
Board of Alderman meetings some details can be deciphered. Before 1923 OFD members
received a professional salary. The number of paid men varied but generally two to three men
received pay of 77 dollars a month, listed under the line item as firemen. Then just as if they had
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never existed their line item in the City’s light and water fund vanished after January of 1923.
The next board meetings’ minutes found that the city had set up a set of rules for the general
public on how to act towards the volunteer fire department. The simple rules included items on
punishment for running over water hose and general conduct at fires. For the next twenty years
the fire protection of Oxford Mississippi became the prerogative of a fully volunteer force. The
payments made on an American Lafrance fire reveals that that the city had an engine at its
disposal. The number of people whom the department had did not change much throughout this
volunteer period. In the late twenties the volunteers numbered near 20, and with a dip in numbers
here and there as the depression began in earnest, yet, the number usually steadied again around
20. 61
OFD faced change during the depression years. It became difficult for the volunteers to
continue to work fully unpaid. So in summer of 1932 the City began paying its members a dollar
for every call that they went on. The pay per call tactic is a common strategy that many volunteer
departments use to increase retention and the volunteers received several raises in the late
thirties. A real turning point came in 1939. The city began paying one man to stand by 24 hours
on Sundays at the city hall with the fire engine. He waited with the sole purpose to drive the
engine to a Sunday fire, a time that proved difficult for volunteers to respond. He only received
$2.50 a day but his service marked the trend that the department had begun down the road to a
paid system. It is inevitable that OFD would return to a paid system as the town grew and the
economic situation returned to normal. The month after the Sunday driver system established
itself another breakthrough occurred. The city allowed one man to live rent free in the apartment
adjacent to the station. In doing so the department and City guaranteed themselves a driver of the
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engine during the night time hours. By 1942 the city had made its final transition back to the
system of paid firemen. Though volunteers remained, the first-full time firemen began work
again in spring of 1942. 62
The Department steadily grew and by 1972 it had three stations and three trucks.
Manning these stations had forced the department to expand to 12 paid staff. That left two men at
each station with two shifts. Each day they worked 24 hours they received 24 hours off. OFD
expanded from that point to gain the business of running the medical calls in the surrounding
area. Such an endeavor did not last long and by the mid-seventies the department had returned to
a sole purpose of fire suppression. The reasoning behind such a move lay in the money. The city
could not find a way to keep a medical service in the black and thus handed out pink slips to all
of the its EMTs effectively mothballing the project. After the shock of so many hires then fires in
a few short years the department downsized to two stations. The downsizing trend soon reversed
with the help from the prime shaker in the local political landscape. In 1974 the University
needed manning of its airport truck. They helped with the purchasing of the land and the
construction of station to meet the FAA regulation on having a crash truck within a certain
distance of the airport with commercial flights. The construction of the station is the first
instance in what would become a long history of the relationship with the University and the
OFD.63
From that point OFD stayed a twelve man operation and in doing so had to remain a two
station system instead of three. With the competition of the new airport station the chief had to
make a tough call and close a station. The manning constrains also necessitated the switching to
a “three platoon system.” The system is the traditional fire department system that supports three
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different shifts of three men each who work 24 hours and receive 48 hour off. The call load of
those shifts remained high for the area in the early days. LCFD still had not been founded prior
to 1977 thus the OFD shouldered the responsibility of responding to all of the fire s in the entire
area. Once again like all departments, as the city grew so did the department. Station three
reopened in the early 80s as the department changed to meet the needs of the growing southern
half of the city and the department finally came to a place where it could hire new personnel.
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Originally much of the training came from in house. Today the national standard for fire
fighter training is set forth by the Minimum Standards of Certification. Mississippi’s equivalency
to the standard is met today by the Fire Fighter 1001 school. But the school did not become
established until later in the 20th century. So OFD mainly used in-house training to keep up to
par on how to fight fire. When the 1001 school became a new standard, the academy allowed for
those who were not hired after its inception to study in their departments and then simply drive
to Jackson for the day to take the written test. In doing so OFD received the standard set for their
training. There persisted an attitude in those seeking certification that some said OFD is the best
trained fire department in the state of Mississippi. The sense of perfection is reflected in the
performance of the firemen. When all members had gone through their certification process, the
department as a whole stood out as one of the few and proud departments that had 100% 1001
certification. The rate proves a testament to the voracity of the 20th century Oxford fireman to
learn their trade. They wanted to be a department that when their men “walked into a room [they]
made their presence known.” 65
A turning point for OFD came when its suppression area expanded yet again. The time
had come for the UFD to disband. The department that had served the University for the last
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half decade in the 80s no longer proved cost effective. It had become much easier for the school
to pay the city in way of equipment and stations as they had with station two, then it would be to
pay the full time personnel that it increasingly needed. The city now needed a ladder truck and
more man power to deal with the high rise buildings on the campus. Six more people hired and a
truck added, the Oxford firefighters faced an increase in their importance. The people that they
covered effectively doubled. 66
Today OFD has continued to expand. With over 60 full time employees and four stations
it is fully professional machine. The city is looking to build a new station and renew its
commitment to the university. Many of those who have served will say that they believe that
OFD has shaped all of the fire departments in the state by the way that it has set examples and
demonstrated what a fire department should be in a state that sometimes has trouble fitting into
the standard of the rest of the country. 67
In Mississippi the problem of insurance has been handled differently than many states.
Like many states Mississippi has an insurance commission that oversees the insurance business
in the state to keep it from taking advantage of the people. Further like every state the Fire
Marshals of Mississippi are a facet of the insurance commission that make sure buildings are
safe. What makes Mississippi different is the state’s Rating Bureau. The Bureau’s organization
and operation is one that is suspect and defines how the state interacts with insurance.
The Fire Marshals of Mississippi are a proud organization. They are largely made up of
people that are or have been both firemen and police officers. The dual nature of their job
requires the fire marshal to wear both hats. They have the honor to enforce the laws that govern
fire safety. The practical meaning is that they are the organization that is in charge of ensuring
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that all state-owned buildings are up to par to the current fire code. In some states the entire
business sector and certain residential sectors are under a state wide fire code that falls under
their Fire Marshal’s enforcement. However, Mississippi has not progressed to a level where that
is a possibility. Thus the Fire Marshal is in charge of the code solely in state buildings. They can
of course offer their services to a business but they charge and do not operate on the tax dollars.
They provide numerous other services for the stat as well, such as the licensing of the fire alarm
companies and even fire investigation. 68
Generally the code that they follow is the International Fire Code and International
Building Code in the 2012 edition published by the International Code Council. The code only
applies to state buildings, again because Mississippi does not have a statewide code. If a
municipality in the state so chooses they can use any code that they want on their own accord but
are not required to. When the local business need a code inspection though, the Fire Marshal can
do it. The local municipalities find ways to make it more cost effective, typically through local
fire department inspectors. 69
The Fire Marshall is a powerful office. When judging much of the code, a lot is up to the
discretion of the inspecting Marshal. The discretionary power is written into the code itself. The
reasoning behind giving such strong power is to help the Fire Marshall. If a code violation is not
in itself dangerous to the structure the Fire Marshall can use his or her authority to waive the
violation at his discretion. It also allows the fire inspector to be less lenient. If a building meets
code on paper, however, the Fire Marshall feels that the building is unsafe because of the way it
is laid out then he may reduce the occupancy load to reduce the risk. In doing it this way
Mississippi copes with the grey area that is building construction. Not every building can fit into
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the confines of a single code. With the training of the Fire Marshal in conjunction with the
building code, the system becomes more resilient. 70
The future of the Fire Marshall’s duties is one that hinges greatly on the issue of
insurance. The insurance companies of the past all felt change coming in times of great fires. The
same is still prevalent today. Though the nation has progressed past the time when cities burnt
from conflagrations, there are still catastrophes. The one in most recent history that has affected
Mississippi is Katrina. Katrina affected the state in a way that nothing else could. There could be
books written about what effect it had on insurance companies and the economy of the state. The
important thing is the storm’s effect on the fire insurance world. The massive devastation planted
the seed for a statewide fire code. The six coastal counties are the majority out of seven counties
in that state that have now adopted a county wide fire codes. Further, state universities were
never required to have insurance until Katrina wrecked the southern campuses beyond repair.
Because of the damage the universities now all are covered by insurance. With a statewide senate
bill for fire codes in committee, it is a possibility that the future of fire inspection will be a
bright one. The state has been preparing for a disaster like Katrina that involves fire for some
time. In an attempt to halt the damages that occurred in the mid 1800s to the vast number of
insurance companies, the state has experimented with different techniques to ensure that such a
catastrophe doesn’t happen here. 71
When the conflagrations of the 19th century went unchecked hundreds or even thousands
of small insurance companies were run into the ground. Those that they insured were never paid
back for what they lost, and in the end everyone suffered. Mississippi realized the problem. The
state population rose much slower than the rest of the nation; it had time to see the mistakes that
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had been made and think of ways to address them. What the state came up with in the early 20th
century has far reaching implications from the day of its inception to now, both positive and
negative. Insurers learned early in the conflagrations period if they set rates on how much they
would charge based on the riskiness of the insurance then they could possibly lessen the chances
of losing too much profit. Mississippi took the lesson a step farther and made the Mississippi
State Rating Bureau. In doing so they created a place that with the original intent to provide a
service to the insurance companies, it now has taken that prerogative down a more malicious
path that does not serve the taxpayers of Mississippi.
The Rating Bureau of Mississippi first appeared in 1924 with Senate Bill number 26. It
came into full effect in the 1927 edition of the Mississippi constitution. The essence of the 1924
law, simply put, required something new of the insurance companies. It required that all
insurance companies licensed to do business in the State be a member of the Rating Bureau. As a
member each company is required to turn in all of their rating and fee information to the Bureau.
The Rating Bureau is then required by the law that established it to make an inspection of every
risk area that it rates. The Bureau cannot make contracts with insurance companies, and if it
wants to change how it rates things it must be approved by the Insurance Commission. Further
the Bureau is not allowed to discriminate on any of the risks that it assesses, and if it does it is
subject to the investigation of the Insurance Commission. The law lays out the goal of the
Bureau in subtle terms. It claims that if any insurance agency in the Bureau makes a profit that
exceeds five percent then it is the Bureau’s job to reduce the rating so that the insurance
company returns that money to the buyer. The state saw what happened in Boston and Chicago;
if so much loss ever occurred here then the state wanted to be able to fix the rates so that no
insurance company could gain to make so much profit through undercutting that it could harm
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the people purchasing their product. This is how it all started, whether the organization continues
in its original vein can be debated. 72
Today the Rating Bureau states its purpose as one that is established to help the insurance
companies that operate within the state. They base their ratings on four main areas: Fire
Department’s effectiveness, water supply, communication and fire codes. In each area those
being inspected begin with 100% and are slowly downgraded in points: The fire department is
rated on its size and effectiveness. The water system is rated on how much it can handle
discharging at one time. Communications are judged on how well they work in a given situation.
The fire codes are set up by the each municipality and generally are inspected by the fire
departments; and their effectiveness further affects rating. All of the criteria are roughly based on
the Insurance Services Office Rating system. The ISO system is the generally accepted rating
system that the rest of the county follows, published by the insurance services office. In
Mississippi, however, the rating system is different. It is these rating differences that begin to
make the Rating Bureau as powerful as it is in Mississippi. Not because the Bureau’s way of
doing things is overbearing and totalitarian but rather that it simply is very secretive of its
process. 73
The Rating Bureau as established in 1924 has since become a different type of animal.
All the insurance companies still have to be members of the Bureau to operate in the state;
however, they maintain the salaries of those that work in the Bureau. In 1924 the Bureau at its
inception took its money from the coffers of the insurance commission, keeping it under the
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control of the state. Now the Bureau is paid for by the companies that it aims to keep in line.
Further, gone is the part of the 1924 law that states the Bureau will ensure that the insurance
companies will not profit more than five percent. Thus the idea that the Bureau is keeping
companies from recklessness is gone. These are the main differences from when the Bureau
started in 1924. The fact that now the Bureau is paid for by the companies makes any
organization vulnerable to illegal discrimination in rates. The fact is that today’s Bureau employs
only two people. The insurance charges for the entire state’s 47,000 square miles are determined
by only two people. A regulatory institution that is paid for by the companies that it regulates and
is only made up of by two people cannot operate without some level of corruption. 74
In the end Rating Bureau’s main deficiency is in accountability. In the 2008 rating report
of the University from the Bureau deducted points for various things in the school’s system, Yet
they did not say why. The ISO rating schedule can be easily attained. It is available for purchase
from the ISO website to any who would like to view it. The simple fact that the Rating Bureau
refuses to give away how it analyzes a city’s fire protection is enough to say that there are things
unseen. The Bureau simply cannot escape corruption in the way that it is set up today. Two
people, who receive their pay from insurance companies, cannot make the decisions that affect
the monthly payments of millions. Effectively the Rating Bureau has become an institution that
no longer protects those that they serve but instead allows the insurance companies to set rates
how they want them just like they in the 19th century. 75
Mississippi embodies all of the facets of the fire service from the departments to the
insurance agencies. It is a state of great beauty, and rich tradition. It is a state that has a tradition
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of fire service that spans the full gambit of the fire department cycle. There will always be a
volunteer department that defines a new type of system so that it eliminates a major problem of
the volunteer system. There will always be a University that improvises what it has, to provide
fire protection to its students, not because it needs to cut its insurance rate but because it should.
And there will always be a professional department that came from a long line of small town
departments that takes breaks when it can get them and does without when it cannot. It is the
actions of the insurance companies, however, throughout its history in the early 1800’s and to
today in this State, that the State needs to improve. They are institutions that look to solely make
money. The way they make it now is less detrimental to both the companies and the people, than
the breaking of the economy when a conflagration swept through. Yet the fact that secretive
underhand things are still going on today in the 21 st century attests to the idea that they want to
make a profit in any way that they can.
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